Abstract-We consider the problem of lossy source coding with side information under a privacy constraint that the reconstruction sequence at a decoder should be kept secret to a certain extent from another terminal such as an eavesdropper, a sender, or a helper. We are interested in how the reconstruction privacy constraint at a particular terminal affects the ratedistortion tradeoff. In this work, we allow the decoder to use a random mapping, and give inner and outer bounds to the rate-distortion-equivocation region for different cases. In the case where each reconstruction symbol depends only on the source description and current side information symbol, the complete rate-distortion-equivocation region is provided. A binary example illustrating a new tradeoff due to the new privacy constraint, and a gain from the use of randomized decoder is given.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) and the growing predominance of smart devices, we are transitioning into a future scenario where almost everyone and everything will be connected. Significant amount of data will be exchanged among users and service providers which inevitably leads to a privacy concern. A user in the network could receive different versions of certain information from different sources. Apart from being able to process the information efficiently, the user may also wish to protect the privacy of his/her action which is taken based on the received information. In this work, we address the privacy concern of the final action/decision taken at the end-user in an information theoretic setting. More specifically, we consider the problem of lossy source coding under the privacy constraint of the end-user whose goal is to reconstruct a sequence subject to a distortion criterion. The privacy concern of the end-user may arise due to the presence of an external eavesdropper or a legitimate terminal such as a sender or a helper who is curious about the final reconstruction. We term the privacy criterion as end-user privacy, and use the normalized equivocation of the reconstruction sequence at a particular terminal as a privacy measure.
Let us consider Fig. 1 where there exist several agents collecting information for the central unit. Assuming that the agents communicate efficient representations of the correlated sources to the central unit through the rate-limited noiseless links so that the central unit is able to estimate a value of some function of the sources F (n) (X n 1 , X n 2 , X n 3 ) satisfying the distortion criterion. However, there is a privacy concern regarding the reconstruction sequence (final decision/action) at the central unit, that it should be kept secret from the agents. This gives rise to a new tradeoff between the achievable ratedistortion pair and privacy of the reconstruction sequence. Potential applications of the illustrated setting include those in the area of distributed cloud services where the end-user (central unit) can process information received from the cloud service providers (agents), while guaranteeing that his/her final action will be kept private from the providers, at least to a certain extent. From the problem formulation point of view, the end-user privacy constraint can also be considered as a complement to the common reconstruction constraint in lossy source coding problems [1] where the reconstruction sequence is instead required to be reproduced at the sender.
In this work, we study a special case of Fig.1 where there are two sources, one of which is available directly at the decoder. We denote by X n the source to be encoded, and Y n the uncoded source available at the decoder. Alternatively, we may view Y n as correlated side information generated from a helper 1 . The reconstruction sequenceX n is an estimate of the value of some component-wise function
Without the end-user privacy constraint, this corresponds to the problem of source coding with side information at the decoder or the Wyner-Ziv problem [2] , [3] . We consider three scenarios where the end-user privacy constraint is imposed at different nodes, namely the eavesdropper, the encoder, and the helper, as shown in Fig. 2, 3 , and 4. Since the goal of end-user privacy is to protect the reconstruction sequence generated at the decoder against any unwanted inferences, we allow the decoder mapping to be a random mapping. It can be shown by an example that the randomized decoder can improve the achievable equivocation rate as compared to the one derived for the deterministic decoder. 1 Here we term a node who only has access to Y n as a helper because it connects to the setting in Fig. 1 in a broader sense. 2 Although the use of randomized encoder might also help especially if the decoder is deterministic, we restrict ourself to the deterministic encoder here. For the case of memoryless reconstruction in Fig. 2 , it can be shown that allowing the use of randomized encoder does not improve the rate-distortionequivocation region.
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A. Contribution
We study an implication of the end-user privacy on the ratedistortion tradeoff where the privacy constraint is imposed at different nodes in the system. A summary of contribution is given below.
• End-user privacy at eavesdropper (Fig. 2) : In Section II we characterize inner and outer bounds to the ratedistortion-equivocation region for the cases where the side information is available non-causally and causally at the decoder. In a special case where the decoder has no memory, that is, each reconstruction symbol depends only on the source description and current side information symbol, the complete characterization of the ratedistortion-equivocation region is given.
• End-user privacy at encoder ( Fig. 3 ): This setting is included in Fig. 2 when Z n = X n , and the results can therefore be obtained straightforwardly.
• End-user privacy at helper (Fig. 4 ): Inner and outer bounds to the rate-distortion-equivocation region are given in Section III.
B. Related Work
The idea of protecting the reconstruction sequence against an eavesdropper was first considered as an additional secrecy constraint in the context of coding for watermarking and encryption in [4] where the author considered a watermarking setting using a secret key sequence to protect the (watermark) message and reconstruction sequences. The main differences of the setting in [4] to our setting are that the author considered the case where there exists a common secret key sequence independent of the message sequence at both encoder and decoder, and that the use of randomized decoder was not considered. It was also studied in a related Shannon cipher system where the secret key is distributed through a capacitylimited channel in [5] . Recently, [6] considered a lossy source coding setting with common secret key and the objective is to maximize a payoff function based on the source, legitimate's and eavesdropper's reconstruction sequences. Under certain assumptions, the payoff function can reduce to the equivocation of the reconstruction sequence. Although it was discussed in [7] that the end-user privacy constraint might be an inconsistent measure of the source secrecy, in our work, it is still a reasonable measure from an end-user's secrecy point of view. Closely related to the end-user privacy, [8] considered the setting of Heegard-Berger lossy source coding [9] where the degraded decoder has an additional privacy constraint on the side information of the stronger decoder. With the focus on source secrecy, secure lossless distributed source coding was studied in [10] , [11] , and [12] . Later the extension to the lossy setting was considered in [13] and the optimal tradeoff between rate, distortion, and equivocation rate of the source for some special cases were characterized. Notations used in the paper follow standard ones in [14] .
II. END-USER PRIVACY AT EAVESDROPPER

A. Problem Formulation
We consider a setting in the presence of an external eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 2 . Source, side information, and reconstruction alphabets, X , Y, Z,X are assumed to be finite. Let (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n-length sequences which are i.i.d.
is assumed to be a component-wise function, where the i th component
. . , n (cf., e.g., [3] ). The end-user privacy at the eavesdropper who has access to W and Z n is measured by the normalized conditional entropy H(X n |W, Z n )/n. We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between rate, distortion, and equivocation of the reconstruction sequence in terms of the rate-distortion-equivocation region.
Definition 1: A (|W (n) |, n)-code for source coding with end-user privacy consists of:
where W (n) is a finite set. Let d : F ×X → [0, ∞) be the single-letter distortion measure. The distortion between the value of the function of source sequence and side information and its estimate at the decoder is defined as
+ is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n there exists a (|W (n) |, n) code such that
The rate-distortion-equivocation region R eve is the set of all achievable tuples. 
over the set of joint distributions factorized as
The cardinality of T and U in R 
Proof:
We refer readers to the extended version [15] for the complete proof of inner and outer bounds, and only provide a sketch of the achievability proof here. The achievable scheme is based on layered coding and Wyner-Ziv binning in which the former aims to provide some degree of freedom to adapt amount of information accessible by the eavesdropper by utilizing two layers of codewords T n and U n , and the latter is used to reduce the rate needed for transmission. In addition, we allow for a randomized decoder where the final reconstruction sequence is generated randomly based on the selected codeword U n and the side information Y n . Let T n (J) and U n (J, K) be the codewords chosen at the encoder, J ∈ [1 : 2 n(I(X;T )+2δǫ) ], K ∈ [1 : 2 n(I(X;U|T )+2δǫ) ], and W 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n(I(X;T |Y )+δǫ) ] and W 2 ∈ [1 : 2 n(I(X;U|T,Y )+δǫ) ] be the corresponding indices of the bins which T n (J) and U n (J, K) belong to. Then W 1 and W 2 are functions of J and K. The equivocation averaged over all possible codebooks can be bounded as follows.
, where (a) follows from, conditioned on the codebook, we have the Markov chainX
, and from Fano's inequality, (b) follows since (J, K) is a function of X n , and that conditioning reduces entropy, (c) from the codebook generation and from bounding the conditional entropy terms (proofs are given in [15] ), and (d) from the Markov chains
In the equivocation bound of R
in , the first term corresponds to uncertainty ofX n due to the use of randomized decoder. The difference I(X; Y |T ) − I(X; Z|T ) can be considered as an additional uncertainty due to the fact that the eavesdropper observes Z n , but not Y n which is used for generatingX n . The last mutual information term is related to the leakage of the second layer codeword U n . However, the fact that it is not clear to interpret might be an indication of the incomplete bound. From the proof of the outer bound R (eve) out , random variable V is related to certain reconstruction symbols and it appears since conditioned on the source description, the reconstruction process is not necessarily memoryless.
Remark 1: We can relate our result to those of other settings where
For example, the inner bound R (eve) in can resemble the optimal result of secure lossless source coding problem considered in [13] . To obtain the rateequivocation region, we setX = U = X.
C. Causal Side Information
Next we consider the variant of Fig. 2 where the side information Y n is available only causally at the decoder. This could be relevant in delay-constrained applications as mentioned in [16] and references therein. We consider the following types of reconstructions.
• Causal reconstruction:X i ∼ p(x i |w, y i ,x i−1 ) for i = 1, . . . , n.
• Memoryless reconstruction:X i ∼ p(x i |w, y i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. 
where H(T |U ) = 0.
1) Causal reconstruction: Proposition 2 (Inner and outer bounds):
The ratedistortion-equivocation region R eve for the problem in Fig. 2 with causal reconstruction satisfies R
Proof: Since the side information is only available causally at the decoder, it cannot be used for binning to reduce the rate as in the case of noncausal side information. The achievable scheme follows that of source coding with causal side information [16] with the additional use of randomized decoder. For the complete proof, please see [15] .
The entropy term in the equivocation bound of R (eve,causal) in corresponds to uncertainty of the reconstruction sequence given that the eavesdropper can decode the codeword U n and has access to the side information Z n .
2) Memoryless reconstruction: Proposition 3 (Rate-distortion-equivocation region):
The rate-distortion-equivocation region R eve for the problem in Fig. 2 with memoryless reconstruction is given by R (eve,causal) in , i.e., R eve = R (eve,causal) in . Proof: The achievability proof is the same as in the case of causal reconstruction. As for the converse proof, let U i W which satisfies
The proof ends using the standard time-sharing argument. Remark 2: For the special case where Y = ∅, the ratedistortion-equivocation region is given by R (eve,causal) in with the corresponding set of distributions such that Y = ∅. We can see that if the decoder is a deterministic mapping, the achievable equivocation rate is zero since the eavesdropper observes everything the decoder does. However, for some D > 0, by using the randomized decoder, we can achieve the equivocation rate of H(X|U, Z) which can be strictly positive.
Remark 3: Proposition 3 resembles the result of the special case in [6, Corollary 5] where there is no shared secret key.
III. END-USER PRIVACY AT HELPER
Next we consider the setting in Fig. 4 where the end-user privacy is imposed at the helper who provides side information Y n to the decoder. We are interested in how the decoder should utilize the correlated side information in the reconstruction while keeping the reconstruction sequence secret from the helper. The problem formulation and definition of the code are similar as before, except that the end-user privacy constraint is now at the helper, i.e., Proof: The achievable scheme implements Wyner-Ziv type coding with the additional use of randomized decoder. For the more detailed proof, please see [15] .
Remark 4: One example showing that randomized decoder can enlarge the rate-distortion-equivocation region is when Y = X in Fig. 4 . Since the source is available completely at the decoder, the zero rate is achievable. In this case, we have that R help is given by R (help) in where X = Y and U = ∅. For any positive D, the randomized decoder could randomly put out a reconstruction sequence that still satisfies the distortion level D, and achieve a positive equivocation rate as opposed to the zero equivocation in the case of deterministic decoder.
IV. BINARY EXAMPLE We consider an example illustrating the potential gain from allowing the use of randomized decoder. Specifically, we consider the setting in Fig. 2 under memoryless reconstruction and assumptions that Z = ∅ and F (X, Y ) = X. Then, we evaluate the corresponding result in Proposition 3.
Let X =X = {0, 1} be binary source and reconstruction alphabets. We assume that the source symbol X is distributed according to Bernoulli(1/2), and side information Y ∈ {0, 1, e} is an erased version of the source with an erasure probability p e . The Hamming distortion measure is assumed, i.e., d(x,x) = 1 if x =x, and zero otherwise. Inspired by the optimal choice of U in the Wyner-Ziv result [2] , we let U be the output of a BSC(p u ), p u ∈ [0, 1/2] with input X. The reconstruction symbol generated from a randomized decoder is chosen s.t.X = Y if Y = e, otherwiseX ∼ PX |U , where PX |U is modelled as a BSC(p 2 ), p 2 ∈ [0, 1/2]. With these assumptions at hand, the inner bound to the rate-distortionequivocation region in Proposition 3 can be specialized as For comparison, we also evaluate the inner bound for the case of the Wyner-Ziv optimal deterministic decoder by setting p 2 = 0. We plot the achievable minimum distortion as a function of equivocation rate for a fixed R = 0.7136, where p e = 0.5. Fig. 5 shows the tradeoff between achievable minimum distortion and equivocation rate for a fixed rate R. We can see that in general the minimum distortion is sacrificed for a higher equivocation. For the same particular structure of P U|X and the given deterministic decoder in this setting, it shows that, for a given rate R and distortion D, a higher equivocation rate △ can be achieved by using a randomized decoder. As for the low equivocation region, we observe a saturation of distortion because the minimum distortion is limited by the rate. The value △ sat at which the minimum distortion cannot be lowered by decreasing △ can be specified as △ sat = h((1 − p e )h −1 (1 − R)), and the corresponding D min (R, △ sat ) = p e h −1 (1 − R) is the minimum distortion according to the Wyner-Ziv rate-distortion function. It could also be interesting to see how tight the inner bounds are by evaluating the outer bound result. However, it involves optimization over an auxiliary random variable which is not straightforward and will be left for future work.
In the special case where Y = ∅, the gain can be shown as follows (cf. Remark 2) . If the decoder is a deterministic mapping, the achievable equivocation rate is always zero since the eavesdropper is as strong as the decoder. The corresponding distortion-rate function for this example is given by D ≥ h −1 (1 − R) [14, Ch.3] . However, by using the randomized decoder as above, we can achieve D ≥ h (by letting p e = 1 in R in,random ). For D = h −1 (1 − R) ⋆ c, where c ∈ (0, 1/2], we can achieve the equivocation rate of h(c) which is strictly positive.
